GIOVANNI SARTORI A TEORIA DA DEMOCRACIA REVISITADA PDF

16 set. Com base nas obras A teoria da democracia revisitada – o debate contemporâneo (Giovanni Sartori), Poliarquia: Participação e Oposição. A Teoria da Democracia Revisitada – Giovani Sartori. 5 likes. Book. From a contemporary point of view, within political science, reference may be made to the work of Giovanni Sartori, A Teoria da Democracia Revisitada, trans.

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Secondly, one should take into account the high level of “deconstitutionalization” required by this sort of proposal Revisigada, In the table we did not consider procedural votes. In the following discussion, we seek to use this argument to explain why legislators’ behavior towards social security reform changed from the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration to the Lula one.

Agora8, Buenos Aires.

O que foi escrito sobre democracia – DAGOBAH

Once constituted the majority coalition, actors set about operating it. They are basically activists and party leaders of the democrqcia coalition and of the opposition, the media, union leaders and other affected interest groups.

However, the scenario would be entirely different had Lula been the winner in Underestimating social and congressional resistances in Congress, “the reform proposed changes in pension funds, in the general regime of social security, and in the one of public servants” Melo, Firstly, the second reform established requisites for current servants to obtain full pension value equal to last wage before retiring.

Throughout the voting of both reforms, PSDB, PFL and PT had to deal concomitantly rsvisitada actors inside the executive, attentive publics, consistent supporters and electors.

In every single roll-call, the administration could count on some votes from PFL and PSDB, which were decisive in the passage of EA 4, in the rejection of DVS 7 and for the final passage of the reform in the second round.

Afterwards, with the entry of Anthony Garotinho, a regional boss in Rio de Janeirothe party caucus grew again, although this did not have any favorable impact on the government’s position, since most of the new democtacia came from the ally PSB. The PSDB could not adopt the same strategy due to the risk of incurring costs from reactions of militants, consistent supporters and attentive publics.

To answer that question one needs firstly to take into account that the Lula Administration is not, and has never been an exclusively PT-led government.

O que foi escrito sobre democracia

It is nonsensical therefore to explain the superior outcome of the reformist process under Lula from the formation of the governing coalition in Congress. As we showed in a previous section, the PFL split down the middle and, tellingly, where the party held governorships most deputies aligned themselves with the state government.

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Social security reform; Executive [Legislative relationship]; government [opposition]. For coalition leaderseither within or outside Congress, the goal is to influence as much as they can the formation of public agenda and decisions pertaining to it.

Political Science Quarterlyvol. This explains why nine deputies changed their position from the voting on substitutive global amendments emenda substitutiva global ESG 4, when they abstained, to the decision on DVS 7, when they ranked with the executive. Nonetheless this proviso, it is remarkable the difference between the fidelity of PMDB, which joined Lula’s coalition during 9and the parties that supported the president either in the first or democrqcia round. More complex is the explanation required for the behavior of Cardoso’s supporters when voting PEC From one administration gjovanni the other, parties like PT, PC do B, PSDB and PFL came to experience a situation that may be characterized by the fact that their previous preferences in relation to social security policy became contradictory with their positions in both governmental and congressional arenas.

Rules for the use of petitions for separate voting DVS.

On giovajni other hand, defections in the governing coalition were also large: The proposal sent by the Chamber of Deputies was discussed for four months and ultimately daa in second round in December In our view, the changes observed in legislative behavior can be explained by the impact of the elections on the way actors were located within the solidarity and organized interests systems in the different decision-making arenas.

It is known that in opposition it is always easier for any party to be consistent with its own ideology and program. We sought to explain not only why leftist parties experienced such a drop in their cohesion rates, once they rose to power, in comparison with the Cardoso period, but also why the opposition, represented now by PSDB and PFL, was not able to join closely its ranks, as the PT once did, against the administration.

When in office, the PSDB did not succeed as the PT did in stage twoin coupling the social security game with its tax reform counterpart.

American Journal of Political Science47 4: However, the distribution of actors across the solidarity and interest systems, within decision-making arenas, determined differences in the strategies available to government and opposition forces in the two periods examined, given the sweeping changes in resources and preferences caused by the elections.

Social security reform in two stages

The party’s position in Congress collided with its governors’ interests, all of them supporting the proposal sent by Lula. Especially where procedural strategies might be employed to cover up deputies’ “footprints” in some actions, therefore preventing citizens to make sense of the causal chain linking their demands to policies passed in Congress and these policies to results actually sarhori.

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Using the Rice index we obtained 54,2. The distribution of preferences and resources among relevant actors, which may vary depending on the setting, will differ according to how these actors are positioned in the several arenas that, “nested”, constitute the game. The second step was taken in the Lula Administration, in the form of another attempt to change the Constitution, the PEC 40, which came to be promulgated by the National Congress on December 19, Finally, the table includes the second round, held on August 27, In settings thus built party discipline is harder to come by.

Only on three votes could the PSDB leader have the support of the party majority for the executive’s proposal. The executive’s measure, soon dismembered by the rapporteur of the Committee on Constitution and Justice CCJ into four different constitutional amendments Figueiredo and Limongi, ; Melo,contributed for the union of the several coalition leaders in a large group against the reform and hampered administration’s attempts to exploit differences between national union confederations and the public servants.

It might be added that both presidents started the reformist process under equally favorable conditions: On the one hand, the above-mentioned change in the rules regarding DVS, which significantly reduced opposition’s latitude. Defeated in its PEC, the administration summoned Congress extraordinarily and succeeded in passing the retirees’ contribution through an ordinary bill, counting on the support of many non-reelected deputies Figueiredo and Limongi, ; Melo, Driven by electors’ concerns over their behavior, congresspersons’ calculations may reinforce the perception that the costs of indiscipline are lower than vertical accountability costs, since roll-calls permit voters to blame individual legislators for the approval of “politically unfeasible proposals”.

His report has not been voted yet. Breaking down by state the PFL votes, one can see that in five out of six roll-calls the presence of a PFL governor had a remarkable influence in the behavior of its deputies in the Chamber.